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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce political competition in a sequential move tax compe-
tition game between two regions for foreign owned mobile capital. It shows that in
case of sequential move, political delegation takes place only in the follower region,
not in the leader region. Moreover, political competition need not necessarily lead
to higher tax rate in equilibrium. These results are in the sharp contrast to the ex-
isting results. Key words: Mobile capital, Tax competition, Political competition,
Leadership, Public good. JEL Classications: F21, H25, D70, H42, D40, R50
1 Introduction
The issue of interregional competition among governments for mobile capital has received
considerable attention in the literature. Typical models of horizontal tax competition sug-
gest that competing regions end up in race-to-the-bottom in terms of tax rates on capital.
This in turn leads to lower tax rates and under provision of public goods in equilibrium
( Wilson (1999)). However, it is well documented in the literature that, in real world,
evidence of race-to-the-bottom in terms of tax rates is quite sparse. In fact, capital tax
rates in most of the countries/regions are quite high ( Marceau et al. (2010)), in spite of
the fact that there are possibilities of tax undercutting by competing regions. Recently,
1Corresponding Address:Ajay Sharma, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
(IGIDR),Film City Road, Gen A. K. Vaidya Marg, Goregaon (East), Mumbai 400065, India. E-mails: y
rupayan@igidr.ac.in, rupayanpal@gmail.com;z ajays@igidr.ac.in., Telephone: +91-22-28416545, Fax: +91-
22-28402752.
1a number of papers have attempted to provide some plausible explanation of such appar-
ently striking empirical observation, such as Marceau et al. (2010), Janeba and Peters
(1999), Ihori and Yang (2009), Brueckner (2001) and Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010),
to name a few. Marceau et al. (2010) show that in case of heterogeneous country size,
when mobile capital and immobile capital are subject to non-discriminatory taxation and
production technologies exhibit constant returns to scale, in equilibrium only the smallest
two regions end up competing in terms of tax rates. But all the other regions set their re-
spective optimal tax rates as that in the absence of tax competition. The reason is, in case
of identical constant returns to scale production technology, entire mobile capital locates in
the country with lowest tax rate and smaller countries, being less endowed with immobile
capital, have less to loose from low taxes 2. Janeba and Peters (1999) also demonstrate
similar results. Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010) provide an alternative explanation of why
tax competition need not necessarily lead to race-to-the-bottom. Considering a general
production function, they show that in case of sequential move game the equilibrium tax
rates are higher than that in case of simultaneous move game, even if the countries are of
same size. The reason is an increase in the tax rate xed by one country induces the other
country to increase its tax rate in case of sequential tax setting by the countries, since tax
rates are strategic complements. Moreover, they demonstrate that sequential move tax
competition leads to Pareto superior outcomes compared to that in case of simultaneous
move. The above mentioned papers implicitly assume that citizens of any region are ho-
mogeneous and, thus, fail to recognize possible implications of political economy aspects
of decision making. In other words, none of these papers examine the eect of political
competition within the regions on inter-regional tax competition, and vice-versa.
There is another strand of literature that attempts to analyze the equilibrium outcomes
of tax competition by taking into account within region elements of politics. In an early
paper, Persson and Tabellini (1992) demonstrates that, if capital endowments of citizens
of a region are dierent from each other and there are representative democracies, in case of
2This result also holds true even if there are dierences in productivity of capital across countries, since
small and less productive countries tax at lower rate.
2intraregional tax competition for mobile capital, the median voter of each region chooses
to appoint a policy maker with preference for higher tax rate than that of the median
voter. Due to such political delegation, equilibrium tax rates are higher than that in case
of no political delegation. That is, political delegation takes place in each region due to
tax competition, which, in turn, restricts harmful race-to-the-bottom in tax rates 3. Ihori
and Yang (2009) nd the same result in case the policy maker is also concerned about
public good provision, unlike as in Persson and Tabellini (1992). Brueckner (2001) also
echoes the same result in a dierent scenario, where citizens are heterogeneous in terms
of their preference for public good 4. The above mentioned papers assume that the policy
makers simultaneously and independently decide the tax rates of their respective regions.
the issue of timing of move in tax competition has been somewhat neglected in this body
of literature, though empirical research has found strong evidence of sequential move tax
competition (see, for example, Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002)). The question is, does
timing of move in tax competition aect the prospect of political delegation? In other
words, is it always optimal for a median voter to delegate the task to decide the tax rate
to someone else? How does the equilibrium look like in case of intraregional political com-
petition and sequential move tax competition?. To the best of our knowledge, these issues
have not been addressed in the literature so far.This paper attempts to ll this gap.
Considering heterogeneous individual preferences for public goods, as in Brueckner
(2001), in this paper we develop a model of sequential move tax competition for mobile
3 Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) emphasize the role of political competition
on policy making in case of representative democracy.
4 Fuest and Huber (2001) consider capital and labour tax as well as political competition. We note here
that these papers also deal with the issue of tax coordination, which is beyond the scope of the present
paper. Other papers in this stream of literature do not consider representative democracy. Rauscher
(1998) and Edwards and Keen (1996) consider that governments are concerned about size of public sector
as in "Leviathan models", Wilson (2005) assume self interested bureaucrats decide the public expenditure
policy while electorates decide the tax policy, and Perroni and Scharf (2001) assume direct democracy in
competing regions.
3capital between two identical regions. Unlike Brueckner (2001), we consider that capital is
completely foreign owned. There are two stages of the game involved. In the rst stage, in
each region a policy maker is selected, via political competition guided by majority voting
rule. In the second stage, policy makers of the two regions sequentially decide their respec-
tive tax rates. We characterize the equilibrium of this game and compare the equilibrium
outcomes with that in case of simultaneous move tax competition.
We show that the follower region's voters delegate the task to decide its tax rate on
capital to a candidate whose preference for public good is stronger than that of the median
voter, as in case of simultaneous move game. In contrast, no such political delegation takes
place in the leader region and the median voter of the leader region herself decides the tax
rate. These are new results. The intuition behind this result is as follows. In the rst
stage, the median voters of both the regions anticipate that, for any given tax rate of the
leader region, the follower region has the incentive to set a lower tax rate in the second
stage. However, if the follower region can credibly convey to the leader region that the
follower region would prefer not to engage in tax undercutting, which is possible only by
delegating the task to decide the tax rate to a policy maker with stronger preference for
public good than that of the median voter, the leader region would set a higher tax rate
compared to that in case of no delegation in the follower region. That is, by making political
delegation in the rst stage the follower region can induce the leader region not to engage
in race-to-the-bottom. On the other hand, the leader region being in the disadvantageous
position, since it needs to set the tax rate rst, does not have any incentive to set a tax
rate that is higher than its median voters preferred tax rate. Moreover, the leader region
also recognizes that it is harmful to set a tax rate that is lower than the median voters
preferred rate, since that would induce the follower region to set a low tax rate. As result,
no political delegation takes place in the leader region, unlike as in the follower region or
in case of simultaneous move tax competition. Clearly, timing of move in tax competition
has implications to political competition, which, in turn, would aect the equilibrium tax
rates. Therefore, it seems that to what extent political competition would restrict the race-
4to-the-bottom in tax rates that depends on the nature of tax competition- simultaneous
or sequential.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents basic framework of the
model. The benchmark case is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the implications
of timing of move in tax competition. Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic framework
Let us consider that there are two symmetric regions, region 1 and region 2, competing for
foreign owned mobile capital in terms of tax rates. Each of the two regions provides local
public goods, which is fully nanced by tax revenue collected from mobile capital. We also
assume that each of the two regions is inhabited by N individuals/voters. There are two
factors of production: labour and capital. Unlike capital, labour is immobile.
For simplicity, we consider that each region has a xed endowment of labour, which is
normalized to be one: L=1. Moreover, each individual is endowed with equal amount of
capital. That is, a typical individual has  = 1
N amount of labour. Total amount of avail-
able capital is assumed to be X = 1, which is allocated between the two regions through
a perfectly competitive capital market.
The production function of the representative rm of region i is assumed to be given by
y = F(Xi;Li);i = 1;2, where Xi is the amount of capital allocated to region i and Li = 1,
assuming full employment in each region. We can write this production function in an





000(xi)  0 and
f
000(xi) = f
000(xj), as in Laussel and Le Breton (1998).
Capital Allocation: It is evident that allocation of capital between the two regions
depends upon productivity of capital as well as the tax rates. Since capital market is
assumed to be perfectly competitive, capital is paid according to its marginal productivity.
So, if xi amount of capital is allocated in region i, the net return from the last unit of
5capital invested in region i is [f
0(xi)   ti], where ti is the tax rate in region i5. Clearly,
to rule out the possibility of arbitrage, we must have [f
0(xi)   ti] = [f
0(xj)   tj];i;j =
1;2;i 6= j. We consider that available mobile capital is fully allocated between the two
regions (x1 + x2 = x = X) and net return from the last unit of investment is positive
[f
0(xi) ti] > 0;i = 1;2),. Therefore, for any t1, t2 the arbitrage proof allocation of mobile
capital between the two regions is given by,
F
0
(x1)   t1 = F
0
(x2)   t2 > 0; (1a)
and x1 + x2 = 1: (1b)
From (1) and (2), we get the equilibrium allocation of capital, given the tax rates,



































00(xj))2 = 0 (2c)
where i;j = 1;2;i 6= j; since f
00(xi) < 0 and f
000(xi) = f
000(xj). Condition (2a) implies
that the amount of capital in region i is decreasing in its own tax rate, but increasing in
its rival region's tax rate. Conditions (2b) and (2c) indicates that the rate of decrease in
amount of capital in any region due to increase in that region's tax rate is not aected by
any of the two region's tax rate. In other words, marginal eect of tax rate of a region on
amount of capital allocated in that region is constant. To ensure the existence of interior
solution, we assume that the elasticity of capital allocation to a region with respect to that
5Price of good y is assumed to be one






< 1 8i = 1;2 (2d)
Individuals(citizens) characteristics: We consider that the utility function of a
typical individual n of region i is as follows.
U
n;i(cn;i;gi) = cn;i + n;iv(gi); (3)
where cn;i is the amount of private good consumed by individual n of region i; gi is the
amount of public good available in region i; n;i(> 0) represents the preference of that
individual for public good and v
0(gi) > 0 > v
00(gi),for i = 1;2 and n = 1;2;:;N. Clearly,
higher value of n;i indicates stronger preference for public good, and each individual has
singled peaked preference for public good 6. We assume that distribution of n is symmetric
across regions, which implies that n;i = n;j = n. The median of the distribution of n
is assumed to be . That is, each region's median voter's preference for public good is
represented by .
For simplicity, we assume that the measure of relative risk aversion with respect to public






< 1 8i = 1;2 (4)
Condition (4) implies that, due to increase in public good, marginal utility of public good
decreases less than the proportionate increase in public good. In simple terms, marginal
utility of public good decreases slowly. Needless to mention that, a fairly large set of utility
functions satisfy this property.
Now, note that, if xi amount of mobile capital is invested in region i, gross returns to
the owners of mobile capital from investment in region i is [xif
0(xi)], since capital is
paid according to its marginal productivity. And, the total wage bill paid to region i is
[f(xi)   xif
0(xi)]. Since capital is foreign owned, each individual supplies  = 1
N amount
of labour only and does not endow any capital and in each region public good is provided
6We demonstrate it in the following section.
7by the government, we can write the budget constraint of a typical individual n of region
i as follows.
cn;i = [f(xi)   xif
0
(xi)] 8i = 1;2 (5)
Governments' budget constraints: Since public good is fully nanced by the tax
revenue, the budget constraint of the government of region i can be written as,
gi = tixi 8i = 1;2 (6)
Note that, from (1a), (1b), (3), (4), and (5), we can write the utility function of a typical
individual n of region i is as follows.
U
n;i(ti;tj) = cn;i(ti;tj) + n;iv(ti;tj)
= [f(xi(ti;tj))   xi(ti;tj)f
0
(xi(ti;tj))] + n;iv(tixi(ti;tj)) (7)
where xi(ti;tj) is obtained by solving (1a) and (1b) for i;j = 1;2. To keep the analysis
tractable, we assume that the utility function Un;i(ti;tj) is concave in (ti;tj); 8i;j = 1;2.
Corollary 1: Utility of public good increases at a decreasing rate due to increase in
own tax rate, and the positive eect of increase in own tax rate on utility of public good is





i < 0 and
@2[n;iv(gi)]
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n;iv












@ti ] + v
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i[1   i]2), since
@2xi
@t2
i = 0. Clearly
@2[n;iv(gi)]
@t2


































@tj > 0, since n;i > 0;v
0(gi) > 0 and
@xi
@tj > 0. QED
Political setup and voting mechanism: We consider that there is representative
democracy in each of the two regions. First, in each region, the representative of citizens,
i.e., the policy maker is determined through political competition guided by the majority
voting rule, as in Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). Next, the
policy makers of the two regions decide tax rates.
We assume that there is no cost attached to contest in election and, thus, each individual
is a possible candidate. The winner (policy maker) in the political competition is elected
by the majority voting rule. Moreover, individuals preferences over tax rates are assumed
to be single peaked 7. That is, an individual prefers a particular tax rate most, and his/her
utility is decreasing in absolute dierence between that tax rate and the actual tax rate.
Therefore, by the median voter theorem, the median voter of a region decides the policy
maker of that region 8. In other words, if we use Condorcet rule for selection of the repre-
sentative, the equilibrium coincides with the median voter 9.
Note that the median voter of a region him/herself need not necessarily be the policy
maker of that region. Following the tradition of existing literature, if the policy maker
is someone dierent from the median voter, we say that there is political delegation. On
the other hand, we say that there is no political delegation, if median voter herself is the
policy maker. Nevertheless, in case of political delegation, the median voter selects such
a policy maker whose optimum policy maximizes the objective of the median voter, since
the policy maker must have the support of the majority.
To illustrate it further, note that according to the public choice and voting literature, if the
7The policy preference of a voter is said to be single peaked, if his preference ordering for alternative
choices is dictated by their relative distance from his/her bliss point ( Persson and Tabellini (2000).
8If the individual voters have single peaked preferences over a given ordering of the policy alternatives,
a Condorcet winner always exists and coincides with the median voters policy choice. See, Persson and
Tabellini (2000) for an excellent discussion on voting mechanism and median voter theorem.
9Since, in our setup, individuals preferences are single peaked and the well known median voter theorem
is applicable, we do not describe the voting mechanism in this paper.
9preferences of the voters are single peaked in the choice of policy variable, there is always
a unique equilibrium policy choice which coincides with the median voters choice. In the
present context, we dene the single peaked property and the median voter theorem as
follows.
Denition 110: Given any tax rate of region j, tj, A tax rate t
i is the most preferred
tax rate of voter n in region i, i Un;i(t
i;tj) > Un;i(ti;tj) for all ti 6= t
i;i;j = 1;2 and
n = 1;2;N.




i are any two tax rates among the possible tax rates for










i. Then voters preferences are single peaked










ij]; i;j = 1;2 and n = 1;2;N.
In simple words, the single peaked preferences means that given any two tax rates on
the either side of the optimal (ideal) tax rate, a voter prefers one tax rate over the other
only if the rst tax rate is nearer to her ideal tax rate compared to the second tax rate.
Clearly, if the individuals utility functions are concave in tax rate, their preferences are
single peaked in terms of tax rate. Since,Un;i(ti;tj) is assumed to be concave in (ti;tj),
for all i;j = 1;2 and n = 1;2;:::N, individual preferences are single peaked in terms of
tax rate. We now write the statement of the median voter theorem and its proof as follows.
Theorem12: If tax rate (t) is a single dimensional choice and all the voters have single
peaked preferences dened over tax rate, the selection of the median voter cannot lose under
majority voting rule.
Proof: Suppose that, in region i, the median voter's most preferred tax rate is t

i . That is
the median voter selects the tax rate t

i . Assume that t
0
i 6= tm








10number of ideal tax rates to the right of t

i . By the denition of single peaked preferences




i. As the median position is t







i are at least R = n
2 and in the majority voting rule the median
voter is selected as the decision maker or the tax rate selected by median voter is preferred
by the majority.
3 Simultaneous move tax competition: Benchmark
case
In this section, we consider that the policy makers of the two regions are engaged in
simultaneous move tax competition. The stages of the game involved are as follows.
Stage 1: Policy makers of the two regions are elected through political competi-
tion, guided by majority voting rule, in the two regions. In other words,
each region's median voter decides whether to delegate the task to de-
termine its tax rate or not.
Stage 2: Policy makers of the two regions decide their respective tax rates simul-
taneously and independently.
Stage 3: Owners of mobile capital decide the allocation of capital between the
two regions.
We note here that Brueckner (2001) also consider a similar setup. In this section, we
characterize the equilibrium of this game. Since our primary interest is to examine the
implications of timing of move in tax competition, it is important to present the results
corresponding to simultaneous move tax competition in order to alienate the eects of
timing of move.
We solve the game using standard backward induction method, starting from stage 3. Note
that, in Stage 3, allocation of capital between the two regions is determined by condition
(1a) and (1b), irrespective of the nature of tax competition (simultaneous or sequential)
and outcome of Stage 1. Moreover, conditions (2a)-(2d) always hold true, irrespective of
11timing of move in tax competition.





p;i(ti;tj) = cp;i(ti;tj) + p;iv(ti;tj) (8)
where expressions for cp;i(ti;tj) and v(ti;tj) are as in (7) corresponding to n = p;8 i;j =
1;2;i 6= j.













+ xi] = 0 (9a)
The second order condition of maximization is satised, since U (.) is assumed to be
concave. Therefore, the tax reaction functions of the two policy makers are given by (9a).
Lemma 1: The slope of the tax reaction function of the region j's policy maker, in
ti   tj plane, is less than one :
@tj
@tijp;j < 1;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j.
Proof: Note that, to prove Lemma 1, it is sucient to show that the slope of the tax
reaction function of the region 2's policy maker, in t1   t2 plane, is less than one. Now
note that the slope of the tax reaction function of the region 2's policy maker, in t1   t2

























2 ] =  A+B








@tj )2 =  
@2[cp;2(:)]
@t1@t2 =  A, B =
@2[p;2v(g2)]




have (C +D) < 0, since Up;2(:) is concave. Therefore,
@t2
@t1jp;2 < 1 , A+B <  (C +D) ,



















@t2 ] < 0,
because
@x2
@t2 < 0,2 < 1,v
00(g2) < 0 and v
0(g2) > 0. Hence,
@t2
@t1jp;2 < 1. QED
Lemma 1 implies that the slope of the region i's policy maker in ti tj plane, is greater
12than one,
@tj














@ti ]];8 i;j = 1;2;i 6= j, which can be positive or negative, depending on the nature of
the functional forms considered. Because, though the second term is positive (by Corol-
lary 1), the sign of the rst term is ambiguous. Therefore, for
@2Up;j(ti;tj)
@ti@tj to be negative,
the rst term must be negative and its magnitude must be greater than the magnitude
of the second term. Otherwise,
@2Up;j(ti;tj)
@ti@tj is positive. In other words, marginal eect of
own tax rate on utility of a policy maker increases due to increase in the rival region's tax
rate, i.e. tax rates are strategic complements, if
@2[cp;j(:)]
@ti@tj > 0 or j
@2[cp;j(:)]
@ti@tj j < j
@2[p;jv(gj)]
@ti@tj j.
Otherwise, tax rates are strategic substitutes. We summarize these results in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: Tax rates can be either strategic substitutes or strategic complements. If
@2[cp;j(:)]
@ti@tj > 0 or j
@2[cp;j(:)]
@ti@tj j < j
@2[p;jv(gj)]
@ti@tj j, tax rates are strategic complements. Alterna-
tively, if
@2[cp;j(:)]
@ti@tj < 0 or j
@2[cp;j(:)]
@ti@tj j > j
@2[p;jv(gj)]
@ti@tj j, tax rates are strategic substitutes.
It is straight forward to check that, if tax rates are strategic complements (substi-
tutes), tax reaction functions are positively (negatively) sloped. That is, when tax rates
are strategic complements (substitutes), it is optimal for a region to reduce (increase)
its tax rate, if there is a decrease in its rival region's tax rate. We note here that ex-
iting studies on tax competition either undermines the case for tax rates to be strate-
gic substitutes or such possibilities does not arise due to the choice of specic objec-
tive functions of the government. To illustrate it further, for example, if p;j =  and
v(gj) = gj(j = 1;2), we get
@Up;i(ti;tj)
@ti > 0 8 i;j = 1;2;i 6= j. That is, if each in-
dividual has same preference for public good, utility function is linear in both public
and private good and individuals prefer public good and private good equally, as in
Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010), tax rates are strategic complements. That is, if each
individual has same preference for public good, utility function is linear in both pub-
lic and private good and individuals prefer public good and private good equally, as
13in Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010), tax rates are strategic complements. This is be-





















the rst term is always positive and the second term becomes zero when p;j =  and
v(gj) = gj. Therefore, if p;j =  and v(gj) = gj;
@2Up;j(ti;tj)
@ti@tj > 0, as in Lemma 1 in Kempf
and Rota-Graziosi (2010). However, if p;j 6=  or v(gj) is not linear in its argument, we
may have strategic substitute tax rates.
For simplicity, we assume that tax rates are strategic complements in the remaining part
of the analysis. It is easy to check that, in case of strategic complements, tax reaction







2 and the denomina-
tor is assumed to be negative.
Assumption: Tax rates are strategic complements and, thus, tax reaction functions of
the two regions' policy makers are positively sloped:
@tj
@tijp;j > 0; 8 i;j = 1;2;i 6= j.
Now, note that equation (9a) implies that [f
00(xi)
@xi
@ti ] = piv





@ti < 1, by (2d). Rearranging the terms, we can write the implicit form of the tax










8 i;j = 1;2;i 6= j (9b)
The second order condition of maximization is satised, since U (.) is assumed to be
concave. Solving the above two equations, given by (9b), we get the stage 2 equilibrium
tax rates tS
1 and tS











Before moving to stage 1 of the game, let's examine the eects of policy makers' prefer-
ences for public good (0
p;is) on equilibrium tax rates. Since public good is nanced by tax
revenue collected, stronger preference for public good of the policy maker induces the policy
14maker to ensure higher tax revenue. Also, note that tax revenue of a region is increasing in




@ti +xi = xi(1 i) > 0, since i < 1 (by (2d)). Therefore,
it seems that a policy maker would set a higher tax rate, if he has stronger preference for
public good. And, since tax rates are assumed to be strategic complements, increase in
preference for public good of a policy maker would induce his rival to set higher tax rate too.
Proposition 1: In case of simultaneous move tax competition, degree of preference for







@p;i > 0;i;j = 1;2. Moreover, increases in tax rate of a region, due to increase in
preference of the policy maker of that region, is more than the corresponding increase in










































































@p;1@t1. Now, note that jHj > 0 (since the equilibrium is assumed to be sta-
ble), @2Up;1
@p;1@t1 = v
0(g1)x1[1   1] > 0 (since 1 < 1); @2Up;2
@t2
2 (by second order condition of
maximization), @2Up;2
@p;1@t2 = 0 (since Up;2(:) does not depend on p;1); @2Up;2
@t1@t2 > 0.Therefore,
jAj > 0 and jBj > 0. So, we get,
@tS
1
@p;1 > 0 and
@tS
2















2 < 1, by Lemma 1, and @2Up;2
@t2











Finally, we turn to analyze the equilibrium choice of policy makers in the two regions
in stage 1. In particular, we are interested to examine whether the median voter delegates
the task of tax determination or not. Note that, in stage 1, the decisive median voter of
a region selects the policymaker so that her own utility is maximized. In other words, in
15stage 1, the median voters of the two regions decide whether to delegate the task of tax
determination or not, simultaneously and independently.








































j are given by (10a) and (10b), and xi(tS
i ;tS
j ) is obtained by substituting
the expressions for tS
i and tS
j to solution of (1a) and (1b).



























@p;i by Proposition 1. Note
that both i and ' are functions of p;i and p;j.
We get the region is median voters desired public good preference parameter p;i from
(12). However, it appears to be cumbersome to express p;i in terms of  (or  in terms of
p;i, in order to gauge the relative magnitudes of  and p;i , directly from (12)13. However,
note that both (9b) and (12) should be satised in equilibrium. Now, from (9b) and (12),

















Clearly, in equilibrium, marginal rate of substitution between the public good and the
private good remains the same in stage 1 and stage 2 of the game. From equation (13), it
is straightforward to observe that p;i > , since 0 < ' < 1;i = 1;2. That is, it is optimal
for the median voter of region i (= 1;2) to delegate the task to determine the tax rate on
her behalf to a policy maker, who has stronger preference for public good than the median
13Second order condition of the maximization problem (11) is satised.
16voter. And, since the two regions are symmetric and tax rates are chosen simultaneously,
we can say that in equilibrium elected policy maker of both the regions will have the same
preference for public good: 
p;1 = 
p;2 > . We summarize this result in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 2: In equilibrium, political delegation takes place in both the regions, when
there is simultaneous move tax competition for foreign owned mobile capital. The policy
maker that is the delegate, of each region has higher preference for public good than that of
the median voter.
From Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, it is evident that the equilibrium tax rates of
both the regions are higher than that in case of no delegation. Therefore, through political
delegation, competing regions can eectively restrict the harmful race-to-the-bottom in
tax rates, in case of simultaneous move tax competition. These results are in line with the
ndings of the existing literature.
4 Sequential move tax competition
We now turn to examine the implications of the timing of move in tax competition on
political delegation. In order to do so, in this section, we rst characterize the equilibrium
corresponding to sequential move tax competition between the two regions. Since the two
regions are symmetric, without any loss of generality we assume that region 1 is the leader
and region 2 is the follower in tax competition. In this case, the stages of the game involved
are as follows.
Stage 1: Policy makers of the two regions are elected through political competi-
tion, guided by majority voting rule, in the two regions. In other words,
each region's median voter decides whether to delegate the task to de-
termine its tax rate or not..
Stage 2: Policy maker of region 1 (the leader) decides its tax rate.
17Stage 3: Policy maker of region 2 (the follower) decides its tax rate, given the tax
rate of region 1.
Stage 4: Owners of mobile capital decide the allocation of capital between the
two regions.
We use backward induction method to solve this game, starting with stage 4. In stage
4, the capital allocation is the same as was decided from equation 1(a) and 1(b), assuming
the public good reference parameter and the tax rates of the leader and the follower region
as given.
Moving on to stage 3, we consider the problem of region 2 (follower), assuming region 1's
tax rate and public good preference parameters are given. The problem of region 2 is same




p;2(t2;t1) = cp;2(t2;t1) + p;2v(t2;t1) (14)













+ x2] = 0 (15a)











The second order condition is satised due to concave U(:) assumption. We get the tax






Region 2's tax rate is a function of the public good preference parameters and region 1's
tax rate.
Next, we consider the problem of region 1 in stage 2. Region 1 decides its tax rate by
taking into account the strategic eect on region 2's tax rate. In the leadership games, we
18assume that the leader knows the reaction function of the follower region and incorporates




p;1(t1;t2) = cp;1(t1;t2) + p;1v(t1;t2) (17)
Subject to the constraint from equation (16), tF
2 = tF
2 (t1;p;1;p;2). The rst order condi-



















) + x1] = 0 (18a)





















Substituting equation (19), in (16), we also get the optimal tax rate chosen by region 2,











Here, we get the optimal tax rates from stage 2 and stage 3, as a function of public good
preference parameter. The properties of these tax rates are the same as in case of simul-
taneous move tax competition, only the magnitude of the outcomes have changed. Both
the tax rates are increasing function of (p;1;p;2), i.e. public good preference parameters
have tax increasing eect. Moreover the change in the tax rate of region i due to change
in the policy maker of region i is higher, compared to the rival region's tax rate (from
proposition 1).
Lastly, we solve stage 1 i.e. political competition in region 1 and region 2 separately and
independently. In this stage, the median voter decides such a policy maker to set tax
19rates, who maximizes the median voter's utility. Here, we are more concerned about the
result in the sense that whether the median voter delegates the policy making and if she
delegates then whether the equilibrium tax rate is higher or lower than the benchmark case
(simultaneous tax competition outcomes).
The problem of the median voter in both the regions is same, irrespective of the move of the
regions (as follower or leader). At this stage, there is no strategic interaction between the
regions, so sequence of moves does not aect the political equilibrium. So the public good
preference parameter in both the regions is decided simultaneously and independently. The
problem is similar to (11), but in place of the simultaneous tax rates, we have sequential
tax rates from (20a) and (20b) and corresponding capital allocation from (1a) and(1b), by
substituting the sequential tax rates.


































































@p;2 (can be shown by a
proof similar to Proposition 1).


































































@p;1 (can be shown by a
proof similar to Proposition 1).
So equation (24) and (22) gives the choice of the desired public good preference parameter
by the median voter in region 1 (leader) and region 2 (follower) respectively.
In this paper, we are more concerned about the position of the policy maker in compar-
ison to the median voter and not about the exact magnitude of the public good preference
parameter. Clearly, we know that in equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution between
public good and private good remains constant. We utilize this property to get the relation
between the median voter's and the policy maker's public good preferences. In sequential
move tax competition, both the regions charge dierent tax rates. So we analyze their
political equilibrium separately.

















The equation for region 2 (follower) is the same as in the benchmark case (13). For
0 < '2 < 1, we can easily observe that p;2 > . This indicates that the policy maker in
region 2 (follower) is on the right side of the median voter. We can say that the median
voter delegates the tax rate decision to the policy maker, who has higher preference for the
public good compared to the median voter herself. So in case of the follower region, there
is political delegation with a tax increasing eect.







































































From this simplied equation (27), we can easily deduce that p;1 = . This indicates that
in political competition the median voter of region 1(leader) does not delegate the tax rate
decision. She decides to become the policy maker herself. This result is in contrast to
the benchmark simultaneous tax competition game, where both the regions delegate the
tax rate decision task. So we observe that if the regions move sequentially then it is not
necessary that a region delegates the tax rate decision. We can say that a region delegates
the policy task only if he is a follower in sequential tax competition but does not delegates
if he chooses to become the leader.
Proposition 3: In a sequential equilibrium, there is political delegation in the follower
region only. There is no political delegation in the leader region, in equilibrium. In the
follower region, the policy maker has higher preferences for public good compared to the
median voter, while in the leader region the median voter herself decides to become the
policy maker and the median voters public good preference level is the optimum.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. In a sequential move tax competition
game, if a region opts to become the follower, then due to strategic complement nature
of tax rates, the follower region's tax rate is below the leader region's tax rate, provided
no political competition is considered (see Kempf and Rota-Greziosi (2010) for proof). At
the rst stage of the game, the median voter of the follower region anticipates that the
policy maker will charge lower tax rate compared to the leader region, given other things
constant, and the provision of public good will be lower than desired by her. We know that
@(tixi)
@ti = xi(1 i) > 0, i.e. higher tax rate leads to higher tax revenue. So there is a scope
for tax rate increase without loss of tax revenue. Therefore in political competition, she
delegates the tax rate decision to such a candidate who values the public good more than
her. This puts an upward pressure on tax rates in the follower region
@tF
2
@p;2 > 0 leading
22to higher tax rate, compared to the no delegation situation, with increased public good
provision. Conversely, in the leader region tax rates are higher and there is higher public
good provision compared to the simultaneous move game (no political competition). So in
stage 1, i.e. in case of political competition, the median voter takes into consideration this
result while deciding the political equilibrium. She does not delegate the tax rate decision
making because the tax rate decided by her (median voter) is optimal to provide public
good at the median voters desired level. If she delegates the policy making to a candidate
with higher public good preference, then the corresponding public good provision would
have been too high compared to the median voter's desired level. These results point out
that there is an optimal tax rate and corresponding public good provision desired by the
representative median voter in each region. It is not always benecial for a region to desire
higher and higher tax rate to get more public good. In case of the leader region, there is
a possibility to charge a higher tax rate; still the median voter opts for no delegation to
restrict the increase in the tax rate.
Proposition 3 indicates that political delegation is less eective to control race-to-the-
bottom in tax rates in case of sequential move tax competition compared to that in case of
simultaneous move tax competition, since in the former case there is political delegation
only at the follower region. However, it appears to be intractable to gauge the actual
magnitude of the eectiveness of political delegation in restricting race-to-the-bottom in tax
rates in case of sequential move competition vis-a-vis simultaneous move tax competition.
We leave it for future research.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of political competition and leadership in intraregional
tax competition on equilibrium tax rates in a modied Wildasin (1988) model. We consider
that there is heterogeneity in the preference for public good by the individuals (voters) in
both the regions. The political equilibrium is decided by the median voter (due to majority
rule) and leadership in tax competition is decided randomly because of symmetric regions.
23We show that, due to political competition through delegation of tax rate decisions, both
the regions charge higher tax rates in case of simultaneous move tax competition, since the
median voter of each region delegates the task to decide tax rate to a policy maker who
has stronger preference for public good than that of the median voter.
However, if the regions move sequentially (i.e. there is leadership in tax competition), it
is not necessary that there is delegation of tax rate decision. We show that only in the
follower region there is political delegation, whereas in the leader region, median voter
becomes the policy maker and no political delegation is exercised in equilibrium. This
result is in sharp contrast to the ndings of the existing literature Ihori and Yang (2009),
Brueckner (2001), Persson and Tabellini (1992).
It seems to be interesting to extend the present analysis to the case of asymmetric regions.
However, that is beyond the scope of the present study. We leave that for future research.
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